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NOTES
THE "BUSINESS PURPOSE" DOCTRINE AND INTEREST DEDUCTIONS
Introduction
One day an American millionaire was visiting an antique shop.
He was intrigued by a gleaming, golden oriental lamp, and re-
calling his childhood memories of Aladdin, he secretively rubbed
it. Before his astonished eyes, a genie appeared, offering to grant
any three wishes.
Bewildered as he was, the millionaire did not lose sight of
the financial realities of life. "I have only one wish," he replied.
"I wish to reduce my taxable income and to realize capital gains."
The genie smiled, and so that no others might hear, whispered
this plan:
"To fulfill your wish, it is necessary that you first borrow
several hundreds of thousands of dollars. With this money you
must purchase securities and then hold them for six months. If
the interest you must pay on the loan exceeds the return you expect
from the securities, do not become alarmed. Any such loss will be
more than offset when you deduct the interest payment from your
gross income and when you report any income from the securities
as a capital gain (taxable at only twenty-five per cent). In this
way it is possible to have your cake and eat it, too. One caveat:
if the transaction is scrutinized by the Internal Revenue Service,
and if, by chance, you are brought to trial, I cannot warrant your
success before the courts. It is not within the power of even a
genie to fathom the mysterious decision-making process utilized
by these august bodies."
The genie was wise indeed to refuse to grant any such war-
ranty, for although the millionaire would violate no section of the
Internal Revenue Code, and although it is a basic tenet of the
"common law" of taxation that a citizen may minimize his tax
by any legal means,' the declared interest deduction might never-
theless be disallowed by the courts.
1 See Gregory v. Helvering, 293 U.S. 465, 469 (1935); Superior Oil Co.
v. Mississippi, 280 U.S. 390, 395-96 (1930).
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The reason for the possible disallowance is based on an in-
evitable imperfection in the body of the Code. It is a fundamental
fact of economic life that the Internal Revenue Code must, of
necessity, deal with broad and general areas rather than with spe-
cific transactions. Because of this, any number of ingenious tax-
payers annually attempt to lighten their tax burden by utilizing
astonishing schemes which, while satisfying the literal terms of the
Code, could lead to absurd tax advantages obviously contrary to
congressional intent.
To offset this type of taxpayer-inventiveness, the courts in
some instances have determined that a proper construction of the
Code will refuse to recognize mere literal compliance with the law.'
Thus, although section 163 of the Code states simply that
all interest paid on indebtedness8 will be deductible, it has been
argued in some cases that a payment of interest on a debt is not
in itself sufficient compliance for the valid declaration of the de-
duction. This argument has evolved from the ambitious attempts
of the courts to discourage the practice of tax avoidance, and it
has serious overtones for both the taxpayer and the tax adviser
in view of the many transactions which are dependent for success
on interest deductions. It is the purpose of this note to discuss the
history, the implications and the validity of this argument.
The Gregory Case
Whenever a court is called upon to determine if a transaction
which is literally "legal" will be recognized for income tax purposes,
2 In one case, where a family partnership agreement existed and income
was attributed to two sons who were full-time students, the Court held that
income could only be distributed among "true partners." Commissioner v.
Culbertson, 337 U.S. 733 (1949). In another case a corporation, under the
guise of a recapitalization-reorganization, created new obligations which it
transferred to stockholders in relation to their former holdings, thereby pro-
ducing the same result as a distribution of cash earnings of equivalent value.
The Court withheld tax immunity since the transactions were actually realized
gains and were merely "cast in the form of a recapitalization-reorganization."
Bazley v. Commissioner, 331 U.S. 737, 742 (1947). Again, where a con-
struction corporation sold its heavy machinery to its chief stockholder and
then leased it back, the court held the purported sale and leasing arrange-
ment to be without substance and effect for tax purposes since the sole
motive and purpose of the transaction was to form a basis for a substantial
tax deduction. W. H. Armston Co. v. Commissioner, 188 F.2d 531 (5th
Cir. 1951).
SINT. REV. CoDE op 1954, § 163(a) provides: "There shall be allowed
as a deduction all interest paid or accrued within the taxable year on in-
debtedness." This was formerly Section 23(b) of the 1939 Code.
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the decision will probably be influenced by the landmark Supreme
Court case of Gregory v. Helvering.4 In Gregory, a corporation
wholly owned by the taxpayer transferred 1,000 shares of stock to
a newly-organized corporation which thereupon issued all of its
shares to the taxpayer. The new corporation was then dissolved
and liquidated, the shares being distributed to the taxpayer, thus
subjecting him to a lower tax liability than would have accom-
panied a direct transfer by dividend.5
Although the plan conformed literally to the Code section
governing corporate reorganizations, the Supreme Court denied
effect to the transactions. The Court reasoned that Congress in-
tended the term corporation to extend only to entities "doing
business"; that tax avoidance in itself was not "doing business";
and thus, that the existence of a corporation whose only purpose
was to escape taxation would be denied validity for tax purposes.
The Gregory rationale has not been limited to the specific
field of corporate reorganization. "It has a much wider scope; it
means that in construing words of a tax statute which describe
commercial or industrial transactions we are to understand them
to refer to transactions entered upon for commercial or industrial
purposes and not to include transactions entered upon for no other
motive but to avoid taxation." 8
It should be noted that a transaction is not invalid merely
because the taxpayer's primary motive is to avoid taxation. The
application of the Gregory doctrine is limited to those instances
where the sole motive, and therefore the sole function, of the
transaction is tax avoidance. 7 Thus, were a man to borrow money
to undertake desirable although unnecessary repairs to his business
property during a high income year, the interest expense incurred
could be validly deducted even though his action would be obviously
motivated by tax considerations. This example indicates the dis-
4293 U.S. 465 (1935); see Holzman, Ten Years of the Gregory Case,
79 J. AccouNTAUcy 215 (1945).
G While upon a complete liquidation only capital gains tax will arise, a
corporate dividend is, in effect, subject to double taxation in that the
corporation first pays a tax on its earnings, and subsequently the taxpayer
is susceptible to tax on ordinary dividends. For an interesting discussion
of this topic see Michaelson, "Business Purpose" And Tax-Free Reorganiza-
tion, 61 YALE L.J. 14 (1952).
6 Commissioner v. Transport Trad. & Term. Corp., 176 F2d 570, 572
(2d Cir. 1949).7 Gregory v. Helvering, supra note 1, at 468. See Maysteel Prods.,
Inc. v. Commissioner, 287 F.2d 429, 431 (7th Cir. 1961) ; Herzfield, Is Inter-
est Deductible When Tax Saving Is Sole Motive ?, 12 J. TAXATIONl 336(1960); 36 Noaz DAmE LAw. 588 (1961).
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tinction between the subjective motive of the taxpayer on the one
hand and the objective goal of the transaction on the other. The
taxpayer wished to avoid tax-but the transaction utilized to achieve
this end also fulfilled a legitimate non-tax purpose. Thus, a tax-
avoidance motive alone will not vitiate a transaction. However,
if both the motive and objective goal of the transaction were di-
rected at tax avoidance, the transaction could be challenged under
Hand's famous restatement of the Gregory rule: "if, however, the
taxpayer enters into a transaction that does not appreciably affect
his beneficial interest except to reduce his tax, the law will dis-
regard it. ,, 8
The Livingstone Cases
The present controversy over whether the Gregory "business
purpose" test should be applied to the area of interest deductions
began with a series of cases involving the financial manipulations
of one Eli Livingstone. 9 The interest deduction scheme which he
invented almost invariably involved alleged borrowing of funds
from a creditor. Upon examination, the courts have consistently
found that the creditor, having inadequate assets, could not possibly
have negotiated the loan. In reality the transactions were mere
bookkeeping devices and paper proceedings.Y0
For example, in Leslie Julian,"' Livingstone loaned the peti-
tioner $80,000. The loan was unsecured, non-interest -bearing, and
not evidenced by a written document. Julian then purchased
through Livingstone $650,000 face value United States Treasury
bonds. Livingstone sold the bonds short as "principal" and did
not charge a commission on the sale. The purchase price of the
bonds was $564,687.50. Julian borrowed $653,250 from Gail Finance
Corporation, whose president-treasurer was a former law partner
of Livingstone, to finance the purchase of the Treasury bonds. He
8 Gilbert v. Commissioner, 248 F.2d 399, 411 (2d Cir. 1957) (dissenting
opinion). See Diamond, Learned Hand And Federal Taxation, 3 SYRAcusa
L. REv. 81 (1951).9 Broome v. United States, 170 F. Supp. 613 (Ct. Cl. 1959); Egbert J.
Miles, 31 T.C. 1001 (1959); Leslie Julian, 31 T.C. 998, aff'd, 273
F.2d 867 (2d Cir. 1959); George G. Lynch, 31 T.C. 990, aff'd 273 F.2d 867
(2d Cir. 1959); Eli D. Goodstein, 30 T.C. 1178 (1958), aff'd, 267 F.2d 127(1st Cir. 1959).10 It is interesting to note that before Livingstone initiated the transactions
he received a ruling letter from the Internal Revenue Service which indicated
that they would be permitted. Eli D. Goodstein, s'uPra note 9, at 1191.
TI Leslie Julian, .'upra note 9.
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executed a non-recourse promissory note in favor of Gail and
pledged the Treasury bonds as security for the loan. At the time
Gail loaned $653,250 to Julian it had only $1,381.65 cash on hand.
To raise additional funds, Gail sold short to Livingstone the iden-
tical type and amount of bonds pledged to it by Julian for the same
price as that paid by Julian. Gail then sent Julian a check for
$88,562.50, an amount representing the difference between the
purchase price of the bonds and its loan to him and he repaid
Livingstone the $80,000 he had borrowed.
Appropriate entries were made on the books of Gail and
Livingstone to reflect the above outlined transactions. Since Gail
owed Livingstone $564,687.50 on behalf of Julian, and since Living-
stone owed Gail a like amount due to the short sale to Livingstone,
the liabilities cancelled each other. No Treasury bonds were phys-
ically transferred between petitioner, Livingstone and Gail.
1 2
More important than the result in the Livingstone cases (the
disallowance of the deduction for interest paid on the loan) was
the judicial rationale utilized in reaching that result. The Tax
Court has refused the deduction on three interdependent grounds:
(1) No Real Loan-section 163 allows "as a deduction all
interest paid or accrued within the taxable year on indebtedness."
The Court has defined interest as "the amount one has contracted
to pay for the use of borrowed money."' 3 Since in the Livingstone
transactions the creditor could not lend (the resources of Gail, for
example, were only slightly over one thousand dollars at the time
of the loan), it was obvious that the debtor could not actually
borrow. Since the money was not borrowed there was no indebt-
edness, and, therefore, no interest could be validly deducted.14
(2) No Business Purpose-the Court adapted the Gregory
doctrine to the Livingstone transactions, holding that an interest
deduction will be allowed only if the transaction is undertaken in
furtherance of a legitimate, non-tax economic purpose. Thus, in
cases where the decision might have rested upon the absence of
a real loan, the Court nevertheless illustrated the applicability of
2For similar transactions see George G. Lynch, supra note 9; Eli D.
Goodstein, supra note 9.
1230d Colony MR. v. Commissioner, 284 U.S. 552, 560 (1931); see
Autenreith v. Commissioner, 115 F2d 856 (3d Cir. 1940).14 E.g., Broome v. United States, supra note 9; Eli D. Goodstein, supra
note 9.
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the more theoretical "business purpos!e" doctrine as an alternative
ground for judgment.' 5
(3) No Real Transaction-in general, when the transaction
was, in reality, something different from what it appeared to be,
the Court disallowed the interest deduction on the ground that the
proceedings were a "sham" for tax purposes.' This label has been
very unsatisfactory and confusing in practice since the courts have
tended to describe a multiplicity of transactions as "shams" when
other, more precise grounds for disallowance were available.'7 Care-
ful examination of these "sham" transactions reveals that they
could have fallen within either the "no real loan" or the "no
business purpose" categories.
On appeal the Tax Court determinations in the Livingstone
cases have been upheld unanimously. The appellate courts have
justified their results on the two basic grounds of no real loan and
no real transaction-but have been reluctant to extend the Gregory
"business purpose" principle into the interest deduction area. For
example, it does not appear that the first and second circuits have
disallowed an interest deduction in a Livingstone transaction on
the basis of "business purpose."18
15 In George G. Lynch, supra note 9, at 996, the court disallowed the
interest deduction under the Gregory rule, and then continued: "Respondent's
determination may be sustained on yet another- basis"--indicating that the
previously considered Gregory rule was indeed itself a "basis." Accord,
Egbert J. Miles, supra note 9, at 1008: "if petitioner did purchase the bonds
and incur an indebtedness he did so but for one reason, to realize a tax
deduction. When examined in this posture, the interest allegedly paid is not
within the intendment of section 23(b) and is not deductible by petitioner."
"I George G. Lynch, supra note 9, at 996.
1 See Blum, Knetsch v. United States: A Pronouncement on Tax Avoid-
ance, 40 TAXES 296, 311 n.73 (1962). The author describes four situations
in which the transactions have been declared "shams":
(1) where "the taxpayer did not establish the jural relationship he
purported to create";(2) where if "the business-purpose test is applicable, a particular entity
performs no business function apart from the tax-reduction plan of which
it is an element";
(3) where "intermediate steps in a series of moves serve no function
other than to provide formal compliance with the requirements for obtaining
an advantageous tax position"; and(4) where "a transaction, which involves binding legal relationships of
more than transitory duration, lacks commercial substance or economic reality
in the sense that the arrangement would not have been embarked upon were
it not for the profit expected to materialize from the presumed tax con-
sequences."
'S Doukas, Tests For Deductibility of Interest Payments: Is Business
Purpose Necessary?, N.Y.U. 17Ta INsT. ON FED. TAx 1259, 1267 (1961).
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In Goodstein v. Commissioner,1" the court recognized that one
ground for the Tax Court disallowance was based on the Gregory
principle. The court affirmed however, on the alternative ground-
that there was no indebtedness and, therefore, there could be no
payment of interest.2
0
In Lynch v. Commissioner and Julian v. Commissioner,21 the
court again considered the government's argument that the interest
deductions were invalidated by the Gregory doctrine, yet stated,
"we are not required to and do not rest our decision here on the
principle of Gregory v. I-elvering." 22  Finding that the financial
proceedings "did not in fact produce the legal transactions which
they simulated," 23 and that "no money was used or forborne," 24
the court upheld the disallowance of the deduction.
The court of appeals in Diggs v. Commissioner,25 declared that
to interpret Gregory to preclude tax relief with respect to any




While in the Livingstone cases the evidence was clear that
no real or enforceable loan had been granted, the case of L. Lee
Stanton2 7 presented a new and challenging factual situation.
Stanton purchased substantial amounts of short-term govern-
ment notes and commercial paper at a discount, and financed the
purchases by actually borrowing money from several banks, giving
his promissory note in the full amounts as security for the loans.
It was found that he anticipated a loss before taxes on one of
the transactions in question.
Examining the proceedings, the Tax Court found a real loan
("the lenders actually advanced the money borrowed for Lee's
use"28 ) and in addition a real transaction ("he was required to do
19267 F.2d 127 (1st Cir. 1959).
20Id. at 131.





25 281 F.2d 326 (2d Cir. 1960).
26 Id. at 329.
2734 T.C. 1 (1960). See Doukas, Though Tax-Saving Is Only Motive,
Interest Is Deductible IRS Concedes, 14 J. TAXATIoN 292 (1961); 74
HARV. L. REv. 783 (1961).
28 L. Lee Stanton, 34 T.C. 1, 8 (1960).
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all that he did do, and no step which he took was lacking in sub-
stance or legal effect" 29). Thus, the question of whether a "business
purpose" was necessary before an interest deduction would be
allowed was presented before the court for consideration. It was
answered in the negative.
It was decided that Stanton might validly deduct the interest
which he paid; that the deduction was in no way dependent on the
use to which the loan was put; and that the "business purpose"
doctrine had no standing as binding precedent in the Tax Court.
In the judgment of the court, all previous deduction cases were
actually decided on the basic ground of no real loan-as a result,
any "business purpose" language in these decisions was never neces-
sary for determination of whether the deduction would be allowed,
and consequently was merely dicta.30
It would appear that the court, in fact, did not effectively
distinguish these "business purpose" decisions. As already in-
dicated, the Tax Court has, in some cases, applied the Gregory
doctrine, as an alternative ground for judgment.31 The Supreme
Court has held that where there are such alternative bases for a
decision, neither can be considered dicta.32
The Stanton dissents espoused the principle that the presence
of a real debt did not, in itself, give recognizable economic reality
to the transaction. It was, they 'determined, only evidence that the
formalities were more rigorously observed. Since the scheme was
set up essentially for tax avoidance, they refused to grant recognition
to the transaction for tax purposes.
An Internal Revenue Service appeal of the Stanton decision
was attempted but subsequently withdrawn, apparently indicating
that the service might acquiesce in the Tax Court determination
and would allow interest deductions once the reality of the debt was
established. The deduction controversy might thus have ended 33
were it not for the fact that subsequent to the Stanton decision,
the United States Supreme Court rendered a decision in the interest
deduction area.
29 Ibid.
80 d. at 10.
31 See note 15 supra.
32 Woods v. Interstate Realty Co., 337 U.S. 535, 537 (1949).
33 The Stanton decision was followed in several subsequent cases, e.g.,
Fabreeka Prods. Co., 34 T.C. 290, 300 (1960); Jack L. Sherman, 34 T.C.
303 (1960); Sadie S. Friedman, 34 T.C. 456 (1960). Although the end
result of the schemes involved in these cases (a deduction for the amortiz-
ation of bond premiums) was disallowed, it was held that since the taxpayers
were granted real loans to finance the transactions, they might properly
deduct the interest so incurred. See 61 MicH. L. REv. 199 (1962).
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Knetsch v. United States
In Knetsch v. United States 34 the taxpayer purchased thirty-
year maturity, deferred annuity savings bonds with a face value, of
$4,000,000. The purchase price was $4,004,000. Knetsch paid $4,000
to the insurance company and signed $4,000,000 of non-recourse
annuity loan notes for the balance, secured by the annuity bonds.
The $140,000 interest on the loan was prepaid. The cash or loan
value of the bonds at the end of one year would be $4,100,000;
however, under the terms of the contract, Knetsch was permitted
to borrow any excess of this amount above his indebtedness. He
thus borrowed $99,000 of the $100,000 excess above his indebted-
ness, and once again paid advance interest of $3,465 on this second
loan. The cycle was continued for three years after which he sur-
rendered the bonds and the indebtedness was cancelled. Knetsch
deducted the interest payments from his gross income.
In holding that Knetsch's interest deduction should not be
allowed, the opinion seemed to employ all three theories of dis-
allowance previously discussed. Looking at "what was done" in the
transaction, the Court found that nothing of substance beyond a
tax deduction could be gained by Knetsch and that therefore the
payment of interest was a "sham." 35 Utilizing the Gregory rationale,
the Court determined that Congress intended that "indebtedness" be
incurred only in pursuance of a legitimate non-tax advantage, and
not in pursuance of a plan solely aimed at tax avoidance. Since
Knetsch's transaction could not affect his "beneficial interest" except
to reduce his tax, it could not give rise to an "indebtedness" within
the statutory intendment, and, therefore, he could pay no interest.3 6
Although this particular type of transaction has been prohib-
ited by statute since 1954, the Knetsch decision is of vital impor-
tance since it represents Supreme Court policy in the entire interest
deduction area.37 The Court, unlike Stanton, maintains that no part
s4364 U.S. 361 (1960).
s5 Id. at 366. The courts often view a transaction as a whole, overlooking
intermediate steps if they do not affect the transaction except to complete
its literal compliance with statutory demands. See Rice, Judicial Techniques in
Combating Tax Avoidance, 51 MicH. L. Rrtv. 1021 (1953).36 Id. at 365-66.3 7 INT. REv. CoDE oF 1954 provides that "no deduction shall be allowed
for . . . (2) any amount paid or accrued on indebtedness incurred or con-
tinued to purchase or carry a single premium life insurance, endowment, or
annuity contract." See generally O'Connor, Knetsch Means Interest Deduc-
tlion Is Allowable Only If Loan Has Real Business Purpose, 14 J. TAXATION
160 (1961); Note, 46 CoR:ELL L.Q. 649 (1961).
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of a transaction will be recognized for tax purposes unless it is
directed at an objective goal beyond mere tax avoidance. Under this
interpretation, the taxpayer (who always has the burden of proof
to sustain the deduction)3" would have to indicate to the satisfaction
of the court that something other than a tax benefit was to be
gained from any transaction under which he wishes to declare an
interest deduction.
Obviously, the Court is not saying that there was no indebted-
ness because there was no enforceable payment of money or because
there was no real loan as in the Livingstone cases. In those de-
cisions, there was no indebtedness because the loans were mere
paper proceedings. However, since the insurance company actually
only loaned to Knetsch a partial rebate of what he had already
paid or secured, it would seem that the Court might have disallowed
the interest deduction on the requirement advocated by the Living-
stone cases, viz., there was no real loan. In fact, the Court referred
to the portion of Knetsch's payments that was not refunded to
him as a "fee for providing the facade of loans."' 9 The applicability
of this theory was not developed as the Court relied heavily on the
Gregory rationale in its decision.
The "business purpose" test, as applied in Knetsch, was fol-
lowed in Bridges v. Commissioner.4 0 There, in two transactions
wholly arranged and handled by a broker, Bridges bought $1,000,000
of United States Treasury notes. In each case the broker arranged
for a bank loan to Bridges, evidenced by a promissory note and
secured by the Treasury notes. Bridges prepaid the interest on the
loans and deducted it from his gross income. It was clear that he
had no hope of profit before taxes and did not expect the excess
of what would be received upon the maturity of the Treasury notes
to exceed or even equal the amount of prepaid interest on the loans.
In denying the deduction, the court found that petitioner could
receive no benefit from the transaction except through a tax
deduction, and stated that interest is deductible "if there is, under
the realities of the terms of the transaction, some reasonable hope
of the transaction appreciably affecting the taxpayer's beneficial
interest other than by tax reduction. . . ., '14
38 Weyl-Zuckerman & Co., 23 T.C. 841, 847 (1955), aff'd, 232 F.2d 2f4
(9th Cir. 1956).
' Knetsch v. United States, 364 U.S. 361, 366 (1960).40325 F.2d 180 (3d Cir. 1963).
41 Id. at 184. One problem raised by the requirement of a "reasonable
hope" is that of determining for whom the hope must be reasonable. Is this
the "reasonable man" standard of the negligence area, or does the court
[ VOL. 39
NOTES
This decision is a clear indication that the "business purpose"
doctrine, although briefly interred by the Stanton decision, has been
revived in the interest deduction area.42 It remains to be de-
termined if the revivification was fortunate.43
Criticism of Extension
There are several reasons why the Gregory "business purpose"
doctrine should not be extended to the interest area.
Section 163 places no express limitation on the deduction and
since other sections of the Code do expressly require a business
purpose before recognition will be granted the transaction, 44 it may
be argued that if Congress wished interest deductions to be allowed
only if the debt were incurred in furtherance of an independent
economic goal, it would have expressed this intent. In fact, an
opportunity to express any such desire was granted Congress in
1924 when the Senate offered an amendment to the 1924 Revenue
Act which would allow a deduction on "all interest paid or accrued
within the taxable year on indebtedness, except on indebtedness
incurred or continued for the purpose of evading the payment of
taxes. . . ."45 Senator Reed explained the purpose of his amend-
really mean "any hope"' of benefit? Another problem will arise if this reason-
able hope test is consistently utilized to determine the validity of various
interest deductions. If the taxpayer invests the loaned money in preferred
stocks or other slightly fluctuating securities, the court must evaluate chang-
ing market conditions and other financial variables ex post facto to decide
if a profit might "reasonably" have been expected. It is a difficult question
of fact in view of the inevitable plea of the taxpayer that he honestly
expected his "beneficial interests" would be affected by the transaction.
42 Before the Stanton decision, insurance transactions similar to that uti-
lized in Knetsch were denied validity for tax purposes under the Gregory
rule. Carl E. Weller, 31 T.C. 33 (1958), aff'd, 270 F.2d 294 (3d Cir. 1959),
cert. denied, 364 U.S. 908 (1960); W. Stuart Emmons, 31 T.C. 26 (1958),
aff'd, 270 F.2d 294 (3d Cir. 1959), cert. denied, 364 U.S. 908 (1960). Contra,
United States v. Bond, 258 F.2d 577 (5th Cir. 1958); see 35 NOTRE DAME
LAW. 155 (1959).
Subsequent to the Stanton decision, the Tax Court allowed an interest
deduction in a three party variant of the Knetsch scheme. In this case, the
taxpayer borrowed from a bank rather than from the insurance company
directly. The court sustained the transaction, finding a real loan. John
Loughran, 19 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 1193 (1960). See Supreme Court Deciding
Knetsch Narrowly, Leaves Question of 3-Way Loans Unanswered, 14 J.
TAXATION 5 (1961).
43 See generally Summers, A Critique of the Business Purpose Doctrine,
41 ORE. L. REV. 38 (1961).
44 See, e.g., INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, §§ 229, 1551.
45 SEIDJAN, LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF FEDERAL INCOME TAX LAWS 1938-
1961 728 (1938). (Emphasis added.)
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ment on the floor of the Senate: "The clause I have undertaken
to insert . . . denies an exemption on account of interest paid of
any kind if the indebtedness was not incurred in good faith for the
purpose of carrying on a business, but was part of a plan or a
device to evade taxation."" The amendment was stricken,47 in-
dicating that Congress did not wish to limit the interest deduction
by a "business purpose" doctrine.
Moreover, although the Gregory decision has not been limited
to the area of corporate reorganization, its extension has been only
to such transactions as are considered "commercial or industrial. 48
Since all loans are not made in connection with "commercial or
industrial" purposes, it is argued that the extension of the doctrine
into the interest area is unwarranted. Furthermore, it would ap-
pear that a rule which theoretically allows a taxpayer to freely
deduct interest on money which he borrows but does not use, and
which forces that same person to prove a reasonable expectation
that his "beneficial interests" would be "appreciably affected" if
that money is utilized, is illogical. Under the Gregory rule, for
example, one taxpayer who borrows money and carefully hides it
under his bed, may freely deduct the interest paid, while another
taxpayer must carry the burden of proving the validity of his de-
duction merely because he invested the money he borrowed.
While it is recognized that borrowed money can, in fact, be-
come part and parcel of a "commercial or industrial" transaction,
and, at the same time be without a "business purpose," nevertheless,
a close examination of the original Gregory case indicates that
disallowance of the interest deduction is unprecedented and un-
realistic. The Supreme Court decision in the Gregory case was
based on a construction of the 'nature of a bona fide corporation.
Whereas a corporation may not be a corporation for tax purposes
if it does not transact business, it does not necessarily follow that,
similarly, interest is not interest because of the use to which the
capital is put. To apply the Gregory rationale to disallow an in-
terest deduction, the court must contend that although this interest
4665 CONG. REc. 8255-56 (1918) (remarks of Senator Reed). In dis-
cussing another amendment, which would disallow interest paid on the pur-
chase of tax-exempt government bonds, and which was enacted into law,
Senator Reed reasoned that the amendment would "exempt interest paid for
the purpose of carrying these tax-exempt securities; but if it is interest paid
on any other character of indebtedness than that, the deduction is to be
allowed." Ibid. (Emphasis added.)
47 H.R. REP. No. 844, 68th Cong., 1st Sess. 18 (1924).
8 Commissioner v. Transport Trad. & Term. Corp., 176 F.2d 570,
572 (2d Cir. 1949).
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is actually the amount paid on borrowed money (the Supreme
Court's own definition of interest)4 9 it will not be within the stat-
utory meaning of interest because the debt was not genuine, since
it was not incurred for any beneficial economic purpose. The
analogy is defective in that the Gregory Court had only to determine
the intrinsic definition of a corporation-it was obvious that a
corporation whose purpose was not to do business was not within
the statutory concept. But to disallow an interest deduction, a
court must look beyond the usual interpretation of interest to the
substance of the whole transaction of which incurring the debt was
only a part. To do this is to go one step beyond the Gregory
reasoning and, as a result, to attach a tenuous construction to
the express and unqualified congressional grant of deduction.
Moreover, any such construction completely ignores the common
experience of businessmen that money actually paid on a debt,
incurred for whatever reason is, in fact, interest.50
Conclusion
It is submitted that the only valid ground for disallowance of
an interest deduction is the absence of an enforceable and real
loan and that any extension of the doctrine of the Gregory case
into this area is unwarranted. It follows that the Stanton case
was decided correctly on the merits and that "business purpose"
language in Knetsch and other decisions must be considered as
immaterial if dicta, and incorrect if not.
Although the courts may wish to disallow certain transactions
which create favorable tax consequences for a taxpayer by his skill-
ful, but merely literal, compliance with the Code, this disallowance
must be based on sound legislative or judicial policy. An interest
deduction cannot be disallowed by an allusion to a presumed con-
gressional intent or by a general statement that the Code cannot
be supposed to "provide an escape from the liabilities it sought
to impose." 5'
The legislature has specifically granted the right to deduct
interest paid on indebtedness. As such, it falls within its exclusive
domain to alter or disallow the availability of deductions in this
area. As the Code now exists, the courts must grant an interest
490 ld Colony R.RL v. Commissioner, 284 U.S. 552, 560 (1931).5OSee Knetsch v. United States, 364 U.S. 361, 371 (1960) (dissenting
opinion).5 1Gilbert v. Commissioner, 248 F.2d 399, 411 (2d Cir. 1957).
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deduction if there is a real debt. Before the "business purpose"
doctrine can be extended to the interest sphere, Congress must
promulgate concrete guidelines for adherence for both the taxpayer
and the Government.
COPYRIGHT AS COLLATERAL IN A SECURED TRANSACTION t
Introduction
The present Copyright Act' is an anachronism. The advent
of modern means of diversified communications has greatly increased
the economic importance of the copyright, for the copyright owner
is no longer limited to the sale of reprinted copies as the only
commercially feasible means of realizing economic gain. However,
if the various media of communication are to be fully exploited
by the copyright owner, the copyright and its divisible parts must
be accessible to the modern vehicles of commercial transferability.
In modern commercial practice, businesses have become com-
pletely reliant on financing, since the size and complex form of
contemporary business have rendered the cash system commercially
infeasible. Financing is a system by which a financier advances
the necessary capital to a business in exchange for a security interest
in its assets. It has become the mainstay of modern business pro-
cedure. In order to protect both the financier and the debtor, an
extensive but burdensome legal system of secured financing has
developed. This system has been recently refined and co-ordinated
by the Uniform Commercial Code (hereinafter referred to as the
Code) which has been adopted by a majority of the states.
The amount of capital that a creditor is willing to advance
to a business will depend on the reliability of the business and the
value of the assets given as collateral. Those businesses which own
copyrights or a divisible part of copyrights constitute a substantial
portion of the business community. The ability of these businesses
to effectively offer a copyright to a creditor as security for his
loan will depend on the stability of this asset. Stability depends
upon the answers to the following questions: (1) are the statutory
rights which inure to a copyright adequate to enable feasible
t Winner of First Place in the 1964 Nathan Burkan Memorial Compe-
tition, St. John's University School of Law.
117 U.S.C. (1952).
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